a research paper by Chris Wallace and David P Myatt.
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Abstract: In the context of a “beauty contest” coordination game (in which payoffs depend on the proximity of actions to an unobserved state variable and to the average action) players choose how much costly attention to pay to various informative signals; they endogenously select information sources and how carefully to listen to them. Each signal has an underlying accuracy (how precisely it identifies the state variable) and a clarity (how easy it is for players to understand what the signal says). The unique information-acquisition equilibrium has interesting properties: only a subset of signals are assigned positive weight and attention; these are the clearest signals available, even if such signals have poor underlying accuracy; the size of the subset shrinks as the complementarity of players’ actions becomes more acute; and, if actions are more complementary, the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium is more public in nature.
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