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Journal Articles

Evolution, Teamwork, and Collective Action: Production Targets in the Private Provision of Public Good

February 12, 2009

by David P Myatt and Chris Wallace.
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forthcoming: Economic Journal 119(534), pp. 61-90, January 2009.
Abstract: A classic collective-action problem arises when private actions generate common consequences; for example, the private provision of a public good. In the context of a collective-action game, this paper asks: what shapes of public-good production function [...]

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The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication, and Obfuscation

August 31, 2008

by Torun Dewan and David P Myatt.
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American Political Science Review, 102(3), pp. 351–368, August 2008.
Abstract: What is leadership? What is good leadership? What is successful leadership? Answers emerge from our study of a formal model in which followers face a coordination problem: they wish to choose the best action [...]

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When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action

March 1, 2008

by Chris Wallace and David P Myatt.
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Review of Economic Studies, 75(2), pp. 499-527, April 2008.
Abstract: This paper studies collective-action games in which the production of a public good requires teamwork. A leading example is a threshold game in which provision requires the voluntary participation of m out of n players. [...]

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An Evolutionary Analysis of the Volunteer’s Dilemma

January 31, 2008

by David P Myatt and Chris Wallace.
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Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), pp. 67-76, January 2008.
Abstract: A public good is produced if and only if a volunteer provides it. There are many pure-strategy Nash equilibria in each of which a single player volunteers. Noisy strategy revisions (for instance, quantal responses) allow play [...]

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Leading the Party: Coordination, Direction, and Communication

November 1, 2007

by Torun Dewan and David P Myatt.
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American Political Science Review, 101(4), pp. 827-845, November 2007.
Abstract: Party activists face a coordination problem: a critical mass—a barrier to coordination—must advocate a single policy alternative if the party is to succeed. The need for direction is the degree to which the merits of the [...]

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On the Theory of Strategic Voting

June 1, 2007

by David P Myatt.
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Review of Economic Studies 74(1), pp. 255-281, January 2007.
Abstract: In a plurality-rule election, a group of voters must coordinate behind one of two challengers in order to defeat a disliked status quo. Departing from existing work, the support for each challenger must be inferred from the private observation of [...]

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Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in the Cabinet

February 28, 2007

by Torun Dewan and David P Myatt.
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American Political Science Review, 101(1), pp. 63-77, February 2007.
Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that a prime minister benefits from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which scandals are positively related to policy activism, so that a prime minister may wish to protect [...]

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Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly

November 30, 2006

by Justin P Johnson and David P Myatt,
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RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3), Autumn 2006.
Abstract: We study a Cournot industry in which each firm sells multiple quality-differentiated products. We use an upgrades approach, working not with the actual products but instead with upgrades from one quality to the next. The properties of [...]

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On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design

June 30, 2006

by Justin P Johnson and David P Myatt.
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American Economic Review, 96(3), pp 756-784, June 2006.
Abstract:
We propose a framework for analyzing transformations of demand. Such transformations frequently stem from changes in the dispersion of consumers’ valuations, which lead to rotations of the demand curve. In many settings, profits are a U-shaped function of dispersion. [...]

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Adaptive Play by Idiosyncratic Agents

July 31, 2004

by David P Myatt and Chris Wallace.
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Games and Economic Behavior, 48 (1), pp. 124-138, 2004.
Abstract: Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large literature. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (Econometrica, 1993) and Young (Econometrica, 1993) studied dynamic models of aggregate behaviour where agents best-respond to observations of population play. Crucially, infrequent mistakes (“mutations”) allow [...]

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