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	<title>David P Myatt &#187; Book Chapters</title>
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	<link>http://www.david-myatt.org</link>
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		<title>Collective Action: Current Perspectives</title>
		<link>http://www.david-myatt.org/book-chapters/collective-action-palgrave</link>
		<comments>http://www.david-myatt.org/book-chapters/collective-action-palgrave#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Feb 2007 12:00:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>dpm</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Book Chapters]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.david-myatt.org/?p=101</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by David P Myatt.
Download a Working-Paper Version in PDF Format.
An entry in the second edition of the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by Steve Durlauf and Larry Blume.
Abstract: Mancur Olson&#8217;s logic of collective action predicts that public-good provision is most likely to fail when the size of the consumer group is large; his public goods [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><p>by <a href="http://www.david-myatt.org/">David P Myatt</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.david-myatt.org/pdf-papers/collective-action-palgrave-2006.pdf">Download a Working-Paper Version in PDF Format</a>.</p>
<p>An entry in the second edition of the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by Steve Durlauf and Larry Blume.</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>Abstract:</strong> Mancur Olson&#8217;s logic of collective action predicts that public-good provision is most likely to fail when the size of the consumer group is large; his public goods are partially rival, and so the private cost of provision is relatively high. With a pure public good, this logic no longer applies, and so attention turns to producer groups. When provision involves teamwork (so that the collective action succeeds when everyone works together) then coordination problems arise. Modern techniques suggest that `good&#8217; equilibria in which provision is successful are robust only when the costs of provision fall below private rather than social benefits.</p></blockquote>
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		<title>The Evolution of Teams</title>
		<link>http://www.david-myatt.org/book-chapters/evolution-teams-chapter</link>
		<comments>http://www.david-myatt.org/book-chapters/evolution-teams-chapter#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Dec 2005 12:00:26 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>dpm</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Book Chapters]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.david-myatt.org/?p=109</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[by Chris Wallace and David P Myatt.
Download a Working-Paper Version in PDF Format.
Chapter 4 of Teamwork: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, pp. 78-101, edited by Natalie Gold, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005.
Abstract: Team formation will often involve a coordination problem. If no-one else is contributing to a team, there is little point in an agent exerting any [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p></p><p>by <a href="http://malroy.econ.ox.ac.uk/ccw/">Chris Wallace</a> and <a href="http://www.david-myatt.org/">David P Myatt</a>.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.david-myatt.org/pdf-papers/evolution-in-teams-chapter-2003.pdf">Download a Working-Paper Version in PDF Format</a>.</p>
<p>Chapter 4 of <a href="ttp://www.palgrave.com/products/Catalogue.aspx?is=1403933901">Teamwork: An Interdisciplinary Perspective</a>, pp. 78-101, edited by Natalie Gold, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2005.</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>Abstract:</strong> Team formation will often involve a coordination problem. If no-one else is contributing to a team, there is little point in an agent exerting any effort. Similarly, once a team is formed, an agent within the team will not leave, as to do so would result in team collapse; non-contributing agents would not join, as they currently receive the benefits of the team’s efforts whilst paying none of the costs. The methods of the stochastic adjustment dynamics literature can help select between these equilibria. Team and population size, and cost and benefit parameters all play a role in determining the chances of successful team formation. Increasing the pool of agents from which to choose team members seems at first glance to have a positive impact upon team formation. However, just one &#8220;bad apple&#8221; within the extended pool can have a disproportionate effect on the outcome. Although an agent with high participation costs would never contribute to a successful team, their mere presence alone can result in the failure of an otherwise successful team.</p></blockquote>
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